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ABA MODEL RULE 8.4(g), DISCRIMINATORY
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe*

I.

INTRODUCTION

More than two decades ago, various courts and bar associations
adopted civility codes to address lawyers’ objectionable speech and
conduct.1 While civility codes articulated useful professional aspirations,
some critics warned that incivility might be used as a disciplinary
standard to restrict lawyers’ constitutionally protected speech.2 The

* Bruce A. Green is the Louis Stein Chair and the Director of the Louis Stein Center for
Law and Ethics at Fordham Law School. Rebecca Roiphe is the Trustee Professor of Law and
Co-Dean for Faculty Scholarship at New York Law School. The article benefitted from the
comments and insights of Josh Blackman, Abner Greene, Renee Knake, Aaron Saiger, Nadine
Strossen, W. Bradley Wendel, and Ellen Yaroshefsky. We would also like to thank the participants
in the New York Law School faculty workshop for their thoughtful contributions on an earlier draft.
1. See,
e.g.,
Lawyers’
Duties,
A.B.A.
(June
2,
2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/policy/conduct_guidelines/lawyers_duties (“We will
abstain from disparaging personal remarks or acrimony toward other counsel, parties, or
witnesses.”); STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITHIN THE SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT,
https://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/forms/Seventh_Circuit_Standards_for_Professional_Conduct.pdf.
Incivility has typically been regarded as a problem of overzealous advocacy, but for a different
view, see Melissa Mortazavi, Incivility as Identity, 2020 MICH. STATE L. REV. 939, 980 (“The legal
profession’s struggle with civility is best understood as an attempt to appear trustworthy and
anti-elitist or increasingly as part of a broader social unmooring of traditional masculinity and a
defensive response to that challenge.”).
2. See, e.g., Amy R. Mashburn, Making Civility Democratic, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1147, 1226
(2011) (“In a society where honesty and a willingness to speak one’s mind are encouraged,
incivility may be the unavoidable result of speech and liberty rights Americans have given
themselves. A democratic civil society is one that tolerates incivility that offends, but does not
imperil or obstruct the fair administration of justice.”). The civility codes were criticized on other
grounds as well. See, e.g., Marvin E. Aspen, A Response to the Civility Naysayers, 28 STETSON L.
REV. 253, 258, 263 (1998) (disputing claims that civility codes would be used to diminish legitimate
advocacy or be used as the basis of civil liability actions); Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as
Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 664 (1994) (contending
“that civility codes are a patrician reaction to the shortcomings of the attorney disciplinary and
regulatory systems and a paradoxical application of the ethics of liberalism,” and that civility codes
“reflect unconscious desires to impose a reactionary and authoritarian conformity upon a rapidly
diversifying profession and to resist redistributions of power to those who have been historically
excluded from the practice of law and denied access to legal services”).
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saving grace at the time was that the codes were not meant to be
enforceable.3
Fast forward, and the American Bar Association (“ABA” or the
“Bar”) is now asking state judiciaries to adopt and enforce restrictions
on objectionable speech as a part of an anti-discrimination and
anti-harassment rule, Rule 8.4(g) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.4 The rule targets unlawful behavior including racial
discrimination and sexual harassment, as well as some bad conduct that
may otherwise be lawful and that might be hard to reach under existing
rules, but that plainly should be sanctioned.5 The purpose of the rule is to
adopt a viewpoint within the profession, and so it sweeps in lawyers’
speech that expresses biased and emotionally harmful beliefs.6 The rule
applies not only to lawyers’ interactions with courts, clients, and other
third parties in the course of legal representation but also to all other
“law-related practice,” including law firm events and educational
forums.7
Our focus is on the constitutionality of Rule 8.4(g)’s restriction on
objectionable speech as distinct from conduct. The rule targets certain
speech and conduct that are based on “race, sex, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital
status or socioeconomic status.”8 In particular, according to the
accompanying comment, Rule 8.4(g) reaches speech that is “derogatory
or demeaning” or that “manifests bias or prejudice towards others” and
is “harmful” (including, presumably, emotionally harmful).9 Although

3. Some of the civility codes were eventually made enforceable, however. See Brenda Smith,
Comment, Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in the “Civil” War Over Proper Attorney Conduct
Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 151, 167 (1998) (giving examples).
4. Rule 8.4(g) provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity,
marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law. This
paragraph does not limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a
representation in accordance with Rule 1.16. This paragraph does not preclude legitimate
advice or advocacy consistent with these Rules.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
5. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493 (2020).
6. See id.
7. The comment to the rule explains that:
Conduct related to the practice of law includes representing clients; interacting with
witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and others while engaged in the practice
of law; operating or managing a law firm or law practice; and participating in bar
association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
8. Id. r. 8.4(g).
9. The comment states: “[D]iscrimination includes harmful verbal or physical conduct that
manifests bias or prejudice towards others. Harassment includes sexual harassment and derogatory
or demeaning verbal or physical conduct. Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances,
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the rule refers to “verbal conduct,” its reach is not limited to the sorts of
speech that one might characterize as “verbal acts,” such as threats,
persistent pressure, or sexual advances,10 or to speech that is merely
incidental to bad physical conduct.11 Nor is the rule limited to extremely
destructive speech—for example, “fighting words” that are likely to
provoke violence,12 or overtly biased speech that creates a hostile work
environment13 or that harms particular individuals in other ways beyond
angering them or hurting their feelings. Under the comment’s broad
construction, the rule applies equally to insults that merely sting.14
Critics say that the rule’s breadth presents a problem because the First
Amendment protects freedom of speech.15
The rule’s proponents do not dispute that the rule extends in part to
lawyers’ constitutionally protected speech.16 The question is in how
requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Id.
r. 8.4 cmt. 3.
10. For instance, if a law firm partner were to say to an associate, “sleep with me or we’ll fire
you,” that would not be protected speech because, as a threat of action, it would be regarded as
conduct. The Court has made a distinction between an employer’s protected speech in the
workplace and threats or promises, which can be regulated. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 579 (1969).
11. Courts have expressed some skepticism about the distinction between “speech” and
“verbal conduct,” observing that “the enterprise of labeling certain verbal or written
communications ‘speech’ and others ‘conduct’ is unprincipled and susceptible to manipulation.”
King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 228 (3d Cir. 2015). Nonetheless, the American Bar
Association (“ABA” or the “Bar”) ethics committee’s opinion interpreting Rule 8.4(g) initially
suggests that the rule extends only to conduct and to speech that has attributes of conduct. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 7 (2020) (“Harassment is a term of common
meaning and usage under the Model Rules. It refers to conduct that is aggressively invasive,
pressuring, or intimidating.”). As the opinion continues, however, any distinction breaks down, and
it becomes clear, as the comment to rule 8.4(g) reflects, that the rule is meant to apply simply to
lawyers’ speech that is racist, sexist, etc. See, e.g., id. at 11 (“[A] lawyer would clearly violate Rule
8.4(g) by directing a hostile racial, ethnic, or gender-based epithet toward another individual, in
circumstances related to the practice of law.”); id. (describing, with approval, an Indiana decision
sanctioning “a lawyer who made racially disparaging accusations in a court filing”).
12. For discussions of how the “fighting words” doctrine has been narrowed since the
Supreme Court first articulated it, see, e.g., United States v. Bartow, 997 F.3d 203, 209-11 (4th Cir.
2021) (words must be likely to provoke violence); Boyle v. Evanchick, No. 19-3270, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 49958, at *14-20 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2020) (holding the same).
13. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (upholding Title VII claim
where sexual harassment creates a hostile work environment).
14. See Josh Blackman, Reply, A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g): The
First Amendment and “Conduct Related to the Practice of Law,” 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241,
244-46 (2017).
15. See, e.g., Bradley S. Abramson, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): Constitutional and Other
Concerns for Matrimonial Lawyers, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 283, 295-98 (2019);
Blackman, supra note 14, at 248-50; George W. Dent, Jr., Model Rule 8.4(g): Blatantly
Unconstitutional and Blatantly Political, 32 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 135, 161-66
(2018); Jack Park, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): An Exercise in Coercing Virtue?, 22 CHAP. L. REV. 267,
273-78 (2019).
16. See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing Between
Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 48 (2018) (“[T]he comments to
Rule 8.4(g) expand on the prohibited conduct in a way that diverges from the Title VII model.
Combined with the rule’s failure to specify that what is being prohibited is the targeted
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large a part. Some argue that examples of constitutionally protected
speech that might be covered by the rule are far-fetched or fanciful, and
that disciplinary authorities can be trusted not to apply the rule to such
speech.17 Whether the rule covers a broad range of objectionable speech,
and therefore encroaches significantly on lawyers’ First Amendment
rights, or bumps up against the First Amendment to a lesser degree,
depends both on how one reads the rule and comment,18 and on how one
reads and applies the First Amendment case law. The rule’s proponents
were initially dismissive of the constitutional concerns,19 but
constitutional scholars’ objections were reinforced in late 2020 when a
federal district court concluded that Pennsylvania’s version of the rule
discriminated based on viewpoint in violation of the First Amendment.20
The First Amendment generally does not allow the government to
punish people for speech, like that covered by Rule 8.4(g), which is
objectionable and emotionally hurtful (“derogatory and demeaning”) and
expounds discreditable (biased or prejudiced) ideas, like that covered by
Rule 8.4(g).21 As we discuss, any such restriction must satisfy strict

victimization of individuals, the comment’s expansiveness may well raise First Amendment
overbreadth concerns.”).
17. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A
Guide for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 235 (2017)
(“Experience teaches us that the kind of biased or harassing speech that will attract the attention of
disciplinary counsel will not enjoy First Amendment protection.”). The late Ronald D. Rotunda
offered many examples of speech that would appear to be forbidden by Rule 8.4(g) but that, in his
view, are constitutionally protected. Memorandum from Heritage Found. 4-5 (Oct. 6, 2016),
http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/LM-191.pdf. Although it is true that disciplinary
authorities have discretion not to bring charges when they conclude that speech covered by the rule
is constitutionally protected, some might lack faith that they will consistently do so. See, e.g., Park,
supra note 15, at 279 (“Vesting discretion in the hands of bar regulators and trusting to their
judgment is no solution.”); cf. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1769 (2017) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion of the
public can be turned against minority and dissenting views to the detriment of all. The First
Amendment does not entrust that power to the government’s benevolence.”).
18. The rule undoubtedly presents interpretive questions. See, e.g., Andrew F. Halaby &
Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g): Legislative History,
Enforceability Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL PRO. 201, 257 (2017) (“The new
model rule is riddled with unanswered questions, including but not limited to uncertainties as to the
meaning of key terms.”).
19. The ABA report to the House of Delegates in support of Rule 8.4(g) contained no analysis
of
constitutional
overbreadth—that
is,
whether
the
rule
reached
substantial
constitutionally-protected speech, and included only a footnote dismissing the possibility that the
rule was unconstitutionally vague. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 9, 11
n.53 (2020).
20. Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 30-32 (E.D. Pa. 2020). The court later
reached the same conclusion after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revised the rule to attempt to
satisfy constitutional concerns. Greenberg v. Goodrich, No. 20-03822, 2022 WL 874953, at *16-37
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2022).
21. See, e.g., Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (holding that federal law could not deny trademarks
for terms that may disparage people); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see infra
note 69 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny.22 Even in public universities, speech codes that forbid
objectionable, biased, painful speech, like that covered by Rule 8.4(g),
go too far.23 The ordinary answer to the problem of demeaning and
derogatory speech in public places is not a legal restriction but more
speech, including public opprobrium. Rule 8.4(g) raises the question of
whether lawyers and their work are different: Is there a compelling
enough reason to single out this sort of racist, sexist, or otherwise biased
speech when it is employed by lawyers and is “related to the practice of
law”?24
To ground our constitutional analysis of Rule 8.4(g), we start with
an example that is neither far-fetched nor fanciful. It is taken from
United States v. Wunsch,25 a disciplinary prosecution of a California
criminal defense lawyer for sending a letter to opposing counsel
derogating and demeaning her based on her sex.26 The lawyer, Frank
Swan, spent several years defending a couple and their daughter in
connection with a federal tax investigation.27 In early 1993, after
securing the daughter’s indictment, the federal prosecutor persuaded the
district court to disqualify Swan and his co-counsel based on their
alleged conflict of interest.28 This was undoubtedly a blow to Swan no
less than to his clients. He expressed his frustration in a letter to the
prosecutor, Elana Artson, attaching a photocopy of part of a California
Lawyer article on negative gender stereotyping of female lawyers.29 The
letter stated, “Your disqualification of . . . me was neither just nor fair to
the defendants. Surely, it serves your interests because now it will be

22. See infra Part II.
23. See, e.g., DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding the
university’s sexual harassment policy constitutionally overbroad insofar as it forbade
“expressive . . . conduct of a . . . gender-motivated nature, when . . . such conduct has the purpose or
effect of creating an . . . offensive environment”); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177,
1182-85 (6th Cir. 1995) (invalidating on overbreadth grounds a university’s “discriminatory
harassment” policy that defined punishable harassment as including “offensive” or “demeaning”
speech, which the court found to encompass constitutionally protected speech). The university’s
“discriminatory harassment” policy was found to be unconstitutionally overbroad where it forbade
[A]ny intentional, unintentional, physical, verbal, or nonverbal behavior that subjects an
individual to an intimidating, hostile or offensive educational, employment or living
environment by . . . (c) demeaning or slurring individuals through . . . written literature
because of their racial or ethnic affiliation; or (d) using symbols, [epithets] or slogans
that infer negative connotations about the individual’s racial or ethnic affiliation.
Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1182; see Catherine J. Ross, Assaultive Words and Constitutional Norms, 66 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 739, 755-57 (2017).
24. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
25. 84 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1996). Wunsch has previously been used to illustrate the rule’s
broad application. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 15, at 168-69.
26. Wunsch, 84 F.3d at 1113.
27. Id. at 1112.
28. Id. at 1112-13.
29. Id. at 1113 n.1.
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easy for you.”30 The attachment stated in capital letters, “M[ale lawyers
play by the rules, discover truth and restore order]. F[emale lawyers are
outside the law, cloud truth and destroy order.]”31 Rather than tossing the
correspondence in the file or the trash, Artson shared it with her office,
resulting in a motion for sanctions, which the district court granted.32
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.33 It disagreed that the
correspondence violated a rule forbidding “conduct which degrades or
impugns the integrity of the Court or in any manner interferes with the
administration of justice.”34 The letter and attachment said nothing about
the court and had no effect on the administration of justice.35 The court
acknowledged that “[i]n a general sense, all manifestations of gender
bias related in any way to the adjudicative process affect the
administration of justice,” but noted that “the courts cannot punish every
expression of gender bias . . . without running afoul of the First
Amendment.”36 Further, the appellate court found that Swan could not
be sanctioned under a different rule requiring lawyers “to abstain from
all offensive personality,” because the rule was void for vagueness.37
Because the rule did “not sufficiently identify the conduct that is
prohibited,” the court concluded that lawyers might worry that it covered
conduct in which they regularly engage as a matter of zealous advocacy,
and the rule might be enforced discriminatorily.38 One member of the
panel disagreed, observing “that lawyers may be subjected to restrictions
on speech that an ordinary citizen cannot,” and that “[t]he dangers of
vagueness—lack of fair notice and adequate warning—are lessened with
respect to the regulation of the legal profession because a lawyer will
understand the context of the statutory language within the code of
behavior that all lawyers are charged with knowing.”39
There is little doubt that many members of our profession—
including the federal prosecutors and the district court in Swan’s case—
would applaud punishing a lawyer for such correspondence. And Rule
8.4(g), which would provide a basis for Swan’s punishment, is clearer
about what it covers than a rule prohibiting “offensive personality.”40
But the First Amendment generally forbids states from punishing people
for sending sexist, derogatory letters, like this one. Our question is
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1116-17.
Id. at 1117 n.10.
Id. at 1114 n.6, 1120.
Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1120-21 (Farris, J., concurring & dissenting).
See id. at 1119.
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whether state courts can enforce a rule making an exception for lawyers,
or whether the First Amendment protects lawyers’ speech equally.
Lawyers are not subject to restrictions on speech simply because they
are lawyers.41 A restriction on lawyers’ speech in a given case would
have to closely serve a compelling government interest.42
We think that many realistic applications of Rule 8.4(g) would fail
this test. Presumably to address this concern, the ABA Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued an opinion in 2020
narrowly interpreting Rule 8.4(g).43 The opinion said that Rule 8.4(g)
does not extend to lawyers who comment on issues of public concern,44
and that the rule typically, though not invariably, applies when lawyers’
remarks are directed at a particular person or persons.45 But even
assuming state disciplinary authorities adopted this interpretation, a
lawyer would remain subject to sanctions for a single degrading or
demeaning comment as in Swan’s letter to the federal prosecutor. This
would be true even if the comment were made outside the context of a
representation—for example, at a law firm lunch outside the
prosecutor’s earshot and without her ever learning of it.46
We do not address whether, as a consequence, Model Rule 8.4(g) is
unconstitutionally overbroad.47 We argue that, regardless of whether the
rule targets a substantial amount of protected expression or a tolerable
amount for constitutional purposes, state courts should not adopt it.
Courts should not adopt and enforce professional conduct rules that,
besides targeting bad conduct that may and should be proscribed,
deliberately and unnecessarily target constitutionally protected speech,
however objectionable. We begin in Part II with a constitutional
overview.48 We show in Part III that plausible applications of the rule to
lawyers’ derogatory, demeaning, or biased speech in the practice of law

41. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. &
Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371-72 (2018) (“[T]his Court has not recognized
‘professional speech’ as a separate category of speech. Speech is not unprotected merely because it
is uttered by ‘professionals.’”).
42. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2371, 2374-75 (holding
restriction on professional speech subject to strict scrutiny).
43. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 6, 11-12 (2020).
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 12-13. As a counterexample, the opinion describes remarks that a hypothetical
senior associate makes to newly hired associates denigrating Muslim lawyers and clients, including
“never trust a Muslim lawyer.” Id. at 13. The opinion states that the remarks are covered by the rule,
explaining “the fact that the comments may not have been directed at a specific individual would
not insulate the lawyer from discipline.” Id. Although the opinion characterizes the remarks as
“harmful,” it does not specify who or what the remarks harm and how. Id.
46. See Memorandum from Heritage Found., supra note 17, at 4.
47. On the overbreadth doctrine, see, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473-76
(2010).
48. See infra Part II.A.
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cannot withstand strict scrutiny.49 In particular, we dispute that the rule
closely serves the interest it says it serves, which is to preserve
“confidence in the legal profession and the legal system.” 50 Finally, in
Part IV, we argue why this makes the current version of the rule
undesirable, even assuming it is not unconstitutional on its face.51
II.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RULE 8.4(g)

This Part briefly discusses how the First Amendment applies to
restrictions, like that of Rule 8.4(g), targeting discriminatory or
harassing speech. It shows that because Rule 8.4(g) is aimed at the
content of speech and discriminates based on viewpoint, the First
Amendment would prevent a legislature from enacting a similar law if it
were applied to nonlawyers because it could not satisfy the strict
scrutiny standard. Rule 8.4(g) is presumptively invalid and subject to
this rigorous standard both because, as Subpart A shows, it constitutes
impermissible viewpoint discrimination,52 and as Subpart B shows, it
constitutes a content-based restriction.53 Finally, Subpart C discusses
strict scrutiny in general54 before we turn in Part III to whether or not
Rule 8.4(g) would meet this demanding test as applied to various speech
covered by the rule.55
A. Impermissible Viewpoint Discrimination
In Matal v. Tam,56 the Supreme Court invalidated a clause in the
federal trademark law that denied approval to any mark that disparaged
members of a racial or ethnic group.57 The Court held that the clause was
an unconstitutional speech restriction, explaining, “[T]hat is viewpoint
discrimination: Giving offense is a viewpoint.”58 The opinion concluded
that the restriction was not adequately justified by the need to protect
members of minority groups “from being ‘bombarded with demeaning
messages in commercial advertising.’”59 Justice Alito explained that this
is just another way of saying that the government has an interest in
preventing offensive speech:

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See infra Part III.D–E.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
Id. at 1757, 1765.
Id. at 1763.
Id. at 1764-65.
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[T]hat idea strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that
demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age,
disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast
of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to
express “the thought that we hate.”60

In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,61 the Supreme Court similarly struck
down a city ordinance criminalizing the use of an object or symbol if the
speaker knows, or reasonably should know, that it would arouse anger or
alarm based on a protected class.62 It did so even though the state court
had limited the reach of the law to “fighting words.” 63 The Court
reasoned that even though the ban applied only to “fighting words”—a
category usually exempt from First Amendment protection—the
government is not free to discriminate against certain viewpoints.64 In
other words, the state cannot pick and choose which fighting words it
wants to ban based on the content of the words, even if it finds these
particular messages to be the most offensive.65 Applying these principles
to the ordinance, the Court held that it was facially invalid even though it
applied to “fighting words” because it targeted only those words directed
at “race, color, creed, religion or gender.”66 Abusive displays of any
other sort were allowed under the ordinance, no matter how harmful or
severe.67
Like the Minnesota ordinance in R.A.V., Rule 8.4(g) singles out
hateful messages based on race or other specified categories.68 And, like
both that ordinance and the law in Matal, the professional conduct rule
addresses biased, prejudiced, demeaning, or derogatory statements only
if they are aimed at one of the protected classes.69 Abusive words of any
other kind are allowed. Furthermore, a comment to the rule explains that
it addresses only those biased words that demean a protected class, not
those that are aimed at promoting diversity.70 Thus, presumably, under
the rule, speakers in a Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) program
60. Id. at 1764 (citing United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
61. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
62. Id. at 380, 391.
63. Id. at 380.
64. Id. at 384.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 391.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 392; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
69. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393-94; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017); MODEL
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
70. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“Lawyers may
engage in conduct undertaken to promote diversity and inclusion without violating this Rule by, for
example, implementing initiatives aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse
employees or sponsoring diverse law student organizations.”).
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would not violate Rule 8.4(g) if they argued that White people are
inherently racist and exploit their privilege to hurt people of color.71
Rule 8.4(g), like the ordinance at issue in R.A.V., discriminates
based on viewpoint and, unlike the ordinance, does not limit its reach to
fighting words.72 It discriminates by allowing lawyers to express
tolerance or approval but not prejudice or bias based on one of the
protected classes.73 And, it allows lawyers to express other forms of
hateful, demeaning opinions, but not those based on one of the protected
classes.74 As the Court said of the law in Matal, “The law . . . reflects the
Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages . . . , the essence of
viewpoint discrimination.”75
B. Content-Based Regulation
Viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious form of content
discrimination,”76 but even if there is no viewpoint discrimination, a law
is presumed invalid if it targets the content of speech.77 A law targets the
content of speech if it is directed at the idea or content of the message
expressed.78 This is true even if the message is outrageous and
offensive.79 The First Amendment protects this sort of speech not
because it has inherent value, but because determining what sort of
language is offensive is a far too subjective enterprise to trust to

71. See generally ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR WHITE
PEOPLE TO TALK ABOUT RACISM (2018) (ebook) (arguing that white people are thin-skinned and
unable to talk about race or confront their privilege, leading to a perpetuation of racist structures).
72. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-92; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020).
73. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
75. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1750.
76. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (holding that
even public property, which the government can reserve for certain uses, does not allow viewpoint
discrimination).
77. The flip side of this is that the government can engage in a time, place, or manner
restriction so long as the restriction is content-neutral. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) (“For a time, place, or manner regulation to be valid, it must be neutral as to
the content of the speech.”). But even if the legal profession would otherwise qualify, Rule 8.4(g) is
not content-neutral.
78. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563-64 (2011). The Court has upheld
laws that incidentally target a message if the law is aimed at the conduct and only incidentally bans
speech. So, for instance, the Court upheld a general law prohibiting destroying draft cards even
when that law was used to target individuals engaged in the symbolic act of burning his card to
protest the war. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369-70, 376-77 (1968). But Rule 8.4(g) is
not a general law aimed at conduct that incidentally affects a particular message. Its entire purpose
is to target that message.
79. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446-49 (1969) (per curiam) (extending
protection to hateful antisemitic and racist speech at a Ku Klux Klan rally because it was not found
to incite violence).
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government officials.80 As the Court in R.A.V. concluded, “The point of
the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in
some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.”81
Rule 8.4(g), like the Minnesota ordinance at issue in R.A.V., is directed
at the content of lawyers’ speech.82 It too invites courts to make a
subjective determination of what constitutes “harmful,” “derogatory,” or
“demeaning” words.83
Of course, the government is allowed to regulate some forms of
discrimination and harassment, and many federal and state
anti-discrimination and harassment policies have withstood challenges.84
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, for instance, to protect against a “hostile work environment.”85
The Court defines this as harassment so severe or pervasive as to “alter
the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive
working environment.”86 According to Justice Scalia, the key distinction
between lawful workplace harassment policies and the ordinance at issue
in R.A.V. is that the workplace harassment laws address conduct and ban
words only incidentally, while the ordinance is aimed at pure speech.87
He explained, “[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed
not against speech but against conduct,”88 and “[w]here the government
does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not
shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory
idea.”89 As a result, “sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other
words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against
sexual discrimination in employment practices.”90
The distinction between speech and conduct is an important one
because if the banned words are part of an ongoing course of conduct,
80. See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (“‘Outrageousness’ in the area
of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to
impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of
a particular expression.”).
81. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
82. See id. at 380; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
83. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
84. E.g., O’Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 735-36 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that
the First Amendment does not protect the displaying of nude pictures and the watching of sexually
explicit movies in the workplace); Baty v. Willamette Indus., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th Cir.
1999) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the speech was protected by the First Amendment);
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (holding that
the defendant’s sexually harassing speech was not protected under the First Amendment).
85. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
86. Id. at 67.
87. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 390. Some scholars have criticized Justice Scalia’s distinction in R.A.V. See, e.g.,
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That
Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 12-16, 20.
90. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389 (emphasis added).
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they are no longer protected speech.91 While there is substantial
disagreement on how to distinguish speech from conduct,92 the Supreme
Court has made it clear that when the harm that the words cause is
personal offense or emotional pain, the speech cannot be classified as
conduct.93 In other words, when the speech at issue causes emotional
harm because of its offensive content, it is protected speech, not
conduct.94 Speech is not an element in the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress for this reason,95 and as the Court held in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,96 when emotional distress is caused solely by
the content of speech, it cannot be the basis of recovery.97 Insofar as
Rule 8.4(g) targets words that manifest “bias or prejudice towards
others” as well as “derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical
conduct,”98 it punishes speech that causes only emotional pain, which
enjoys full protection under the First Amendment.
The Court in R.A.V. also explained this distinction. The First
Amendment does not prohibit regulations that punish words only as an
incident to regulating certain conduct.99 Policies, like the hate speech
ordinance, aimed at insults, not at conduct, even when they concern race,
ethnicity, gender, or another protected class, are subject to the most
rigorous analysis under the First Amendment because they target the
91. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“[I]t has never been
deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed.”); see also Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S.
47, 62-65 (2006) (upholding a law that denied federal funding to universities that banned military
recruiters from coming to campus because the law targeted conduct not words).
92. See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277,
1278-86 (2005).
93. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring) (“Our fighting words cases have made
clear, however, that such generalized reactions are not sufficient to strip expression of its
constitutional protection. The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or
resentment does not render the expression unprotected.”).
94. See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding that an offensive ad
parody about a public figure was protected speech even though it caused emotional distress); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17, 26 (1971) (finding a generally applicable breach of the peace law
unconstitutional when it was applied to a person wearing a “Fuck the Draft” message on a jacket).
95. Intentional
Infliction
of
Emotional
Distress,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intentional_infliction_of_emotional_distress (last visited Apr. 23,
2022).
96. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
97. Id. at 55-56.
98. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
99. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992). The Court reiterated this point that
the government cannot regulate pure hate speech in Virginia v. Black. In an opinion written by
Justice O’Connor, the Court invalidated a provision of a statute that made it prima facie evidence of
intimidation for an individual to burn a cross. The Court explained that the provision was
unconstitutional because it failed to take into account that cross-burning can be an expression of
ideology, a symbol of group solidarity, or a part of art designed to repudiate racism. In any event,
cross-burning at a rally would certainly be protected speech. 538 U.S. 343, 365-67 (2003).
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content of the speech and the viewpoint of the speaker.100 Rule 8.4(g)’s
definition of discrimination and harassment includes speech directed at a
protected class that causes only emotional harm.101 Thus, Rule 8.4(g), in
part, regulates the content of speech, not conduct. The provisions of Rule
8.4(g) addressing harassing, demeaning, and emotionally harmful speech
would be subject to strict scrutiny even if they did not discriminate based
on viewpoint, which they do.
Courts have struck down multiple university sexual harassment and
anti-discrimination policies under the First Amendment,102 particularly
when the policies target offensive words that cause only emotional harm
without necessarily impeding the targeted student’s ability to learn.103
For instance, several courts have found university policies overbroad
because they bar students from, among other things, saying offensive
things that do not actually interfere with another student’s learning
environment.104
Another set of cases on university harassment policies makes it
clear that the proscribed speech must be directed at a particular person or
persons because the First Amendment clearly protects offensive
messages disseminated to the general public as opposed to words that
actually cause harm to one or more people.105 Federal anti-harassment
laws require that the banned speech substantially interfere with the
learning or work environment of particular persons.106 Rule 8.4(g) has
no such limitation. A discriminatory or harassing speech at a firm event
would be covered even if it were not directed at one or more
individuals.107 Without this limitation, it is even clearer that Rule 8.4(g)
100. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir.
1995); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 2001).
101. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
102. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1182-83 (6th Cir. 1995) (striking
down a university policy as overbroad because it was viewpoint discriminatory); Coll. Republicans
at S.F. State Univ. v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (finding a likelihood of
success on claim that the university civility code was overbroad); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp.
2d 853, 872 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (finding a school policy banning insults, epithets, ridicule, and
personal attacks overbroad).
103. See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 237-38, 252 (3d Cir. 2010)
(invalidating university policy that bans speech causing “mental harm” or “emotional distress”);
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204-05, 210 (striking down a college harassment policy in part because it did not
require that the offensive speech substantially interfere with a person’s learning environment); Iota
Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 1993)
(invalidating a policy that banned racially offensive speech).
104. See e.g., Saxe, 240 F.3d at 210-11; DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317, 319-20
(3d Cir. 2008).
105. See Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 2010).
For an argument that this line ought to have constitutional significance, see Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1846-71 (1992).
106. See Volokh, supra note 105, at 1816 n.111.
107. The ABA has clarified that Rule 8.4(g) does not extend to lawyers’ speeches on matters of
public concern and will typically apply to words directed at a specific person or persons. ABA
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proscribes pure speech because it is not tied to conduct that might
intrude on the rights of any particular listener.108
Although the comments to Rule 8.4(g) refer to “verbal conduct,”
the rule targets speech no less than conduct.109 The Supreme Court has
stated that the key in determining whether a law targets speech or
conduct is to assess whether there is any possibility that the government
is stifling a particular message.110 If so, it is engaged in impermissible
content regulation and viewpoint discrimination.111 Here, the entire
purpose of the rule is to single out a particular viewpoint. The ABA is
targeting offensive speech based on a protected class, so the rule is
clearly directed at the content of the message.112 One might argue that
the rule seeks to ban the conduct of discrimination and harassment by
banning the words used to carry it out. But a rule prohibiting words that
“manifest bias or prejudice” covers more speech than is necessary to
prevent the acts of discrimination and harassment, which require some
interference with an individual’s ability to carry on her work or some
other concrete harm.113
Relatedly, the government can regulate words when the law is
really addressing a secondary effect of the speech, rather than the
message itself.114 But this doctrine does not apply when the secondary
effects are merely emotional reactions to the words. With the ordinance
in R.A.V. or Rule 8.4(g), the secondary effects of some of the proscribed
speech are personal offenses.115 As the Court has explained, “If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because

Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 13-14 (2020). This language is not, however,
binding. Nor is it dictated by the plain language of the rule and its comments. In addition, the use of
the word “typically” implies that a regulator would have the discretion to apply it in such
circumstances. See id. at 14.
108. See Rodriguez, 605 F.3d at 710. For an argument that workplace harassment laws would
be constitutional if they required all covered speech to be directed at particular individuals, see
Volokh, supra note 105, at 1796.
109. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
110. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 326-27, 329 (1988).
111. See id. at 319, 321.
112. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
113. See id. r. 8.4 cmt. 3.
114. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-52 (1986) (holding that a
zoning law directed at adult theaters was really aimed at preventing secondary effects on the
community, not at the content of the films).
115. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321. The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not the kind of
secondary effect that alters the First Amendment analysis. The Court in Boos invalidated an
ordinance barring hostile images outside of embassies. Id. When the law was challenged as
impermissible content regulation, the government defended it on the ground that it was aimed at the
“secondary effect” of the dignitaries’ offense. Id. The Court rejected this rationale, reasoning,
“Listeners’ reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary effects’ we referred to in
Renton. . . . The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.’” Id.
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society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”116 Thus, it seems
uncontroversial to conclude that Rule 8.4(g) covers much speech that
would be protected if it were aimed at the general public, not just
lawyers.
C. Strict Scrutiny
As viewpoint discrimination or a content-based regulation, Rule
8.4(g) would be subject to strict scrutiny if it were directed at the general
public.117 This Subpart addresses the next question: whether it could
withstand such analysis. The most exacting level of review, strict
scrutiny, requires that the regulation be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest.118
In analogous cases, the Court has found that restrictions on speech
similar to Rule 8.4(g) fail to survive this test. For instance, once the
Court in R.A.V. determined that the ordinance discriminated based on
viewpoint, it applied strict scrutiny.119 Justice Scalia noted that
protecting the “basic human rights of members of groups that have
historically been subjected to discrimination” is a compelling interest.120
But this interest did not justify selectively silencing speech based on
content,121 because there is not a close enough fit between the ordinance
and the government’s interest: “The dispositive question . . . is whether
content discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul’s
compelling interests; it plainly is not. An ordinance not limited to the
favored topics, for example, would have precisely the same beneficial
effect.”122
In Matal, the Court did not think a legitimate government interest
justified the anti-discrimination provision of the trademark law.123 The
interest, in Justice Alito’s assessment, was really in protecting certain
groups from offensive language, and this sort of interest can never be
sufficient because it strikes at the very purpose of the First
Amendment.124 The Court in Matal concluded that the trademark law
involved would not even pass the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny test

116. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
117. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (holding that any law that targets
the content of speech is subject to strict scrutiny).
118. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
119. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 395-96 (1992).
120. Id. at 395.
121. Id. at 391-92.
122. Id. at 395-96.
123. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017). The Court does acknowledge another
potential government interest in protecting the orderly flow of commerce, but that interest is clearly
not relevant to Rule 8.4(g). Id.
124. Id. at 1765.
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involved when commercial speech is at issue.125 But whether you adopt
the Court’s view in R.A.V. or Matal, it seems unlikely that a law aimed
at biased or harassing speech on the basis of a person’s membership in
protected groups that offends, but does not cause any other harm, could
withstand strict scrutiny.
Rule 8.4(g) would similarly fail strict scrutiny if it were applied to
nonlawyers either because it is not narrowly tailored to a compelling
government interest or because the government interest itself is faulty
from a First Amendment perspective. Applying the reasoning in R.A.V.,
a general rule barring offensive speech by lawyers would achieve the
same goal of protecting the human rights of those affected.126 The
interest being served, like the one in Matal, is really protecting minority
groups from offensive speech, which would swallow up the bedrock
First Amendment principle that even offensive speech is protected.127
In Part III below, we discuss whether the strict scrutiny analysis
will come out differently because the speakers are lawyers.128
III.

ARE LAWYERS DIFFERENT?

Discussions of Rule 8.4(g) generally give short shrift to whether the
rule satisfies strict scrutiny. Some assume that the rule is drawn narrowly
enough, or will be applied narrowly enough, to avoid having to meet this
test.129 Others assume that the rule is adequately justified by courts’
authority to regulate the Bar,130 or that it is justified at least insofar as it
applies to lawyers’ work in the course of representing clients, although
not necessarily to lawyers other professional activities.131 Conversely,
some critics assume that a strict scrutiny standard cannot possibly be
met, so there is no need to analyze how well the rule serves legitimate
regulatory aims.132
Identifying compelling interests served by the rule and analyzing
whether these interests are closely served turns out to be easier said than
done because the rule applies to a broad range of lawyers’ speech across
125. Id. at 1754.
126. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 394.
127. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764.
128. See infra Part III.A–E.
129. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 10 (2020) (“[T]he fact
that it is possible to construe a rule’s language to reach conduct protected by the First Amendment is
not fatal to its application to unprotected conduct.”).
130. See, e.g., Aviel, supra note 16, at 40 (“[R]egulation of the legal profession is ‘legitimately
regarded as a “carve-out” from the general marketplace.’”).
131. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 14, at 256.
132. See, e.g., Aviel, supra note 16, at 54 (“[I]t is simply not possible to imagine that even
where lawyers are concerned, the Court would find a sufficiently strong government interest in
prohibiting the wide swath of arguably derogatory or demeaning statements illustrated by Professor
Blackman’s examples.”).
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a broad range of professional conduct, including both litigation and
transactional representations, as well as interactions with colleagues in
one’s law office, or in professional organizations outside of legal
representation. Even while representing clients, lawyers might transgress
in many ways. Different justifications might be offered depending on the
context. As discussed below, most justifications relate to only a fraction
of the speech covered by the rule, and broader justifications are not
closely served by the rule’s speech restriction.133
A. Protecting the Lawyer-Client Relationship
It seems easy to justify forbidding lawyers from gratuitously
derogating or demeaning clients to their faces. The lawyer-client
relationship is supposed to be one of trust and confidence.134 Whether
biased or not, lawyers’ derogatory and demeaning attacks on clients
undermine that fiduciary relationship.135 But this justification covers
only a narrow range of statements within the rule’s reach. The interest in
protecting the fiduciary relationship does not cover derogatory and
demeaning statements targeting opposing parties, opposing counsel,
colleagues, or anyone else aside from clients.
This is not to say that even a rule drawn narrowly to protect only
clients may permissibly discriminate based on viewpoint. Lawyers’
derogatory and demeaning comments may be just as painful to the client,
and just as damaging to the client’s trust, when based on irrelevant
personal attributes outside the rule, such as the client’s appearance or
lack of education. Even the compelling interest in promoting clients’
trust might not justify punishing gratuitous slights and slurs based on
race, sex, religion, or another attribute covered by the rule, while
exempting equally hurtful statements with other bases. Even if lawyers’
gratuitously derogatory and demeaning speech could otherwise be
restricted, it may not be possible to justify singling out certain biased
remarks for harsher treatment.136 But insofar as one is concerned with
protecting the fiduciary relationship, it should be possible to craft a rule

133. See infra Part III.A–E.
134. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
135. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Lawyers and the Lies They Tell, 69 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4, 15-16) (on file with authors). Arguably, derogating
clients publicly or to some third parties would be a breach of the lawyer’s fiduciary duty of loyalty
and would, therefore, also be punishable, assuming the rule applies to some derogatory statements
outside the target’s presence. However, the fiduciary rationale might not apply to a lawyer’s
derogatory statements about a client made privately to colleagues or co-counsel.
136. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391, 393-94 (1992) (striking down a law that
differentiated among “fighting words” and punished only those that were aimed at a protected
class).
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that does not discriminate based on the message contained in the
lawyer’s speech.
B. Protecting the Administration of Justice
Likewise, the First Amendment probably would not protect
gratuitously derogatory and demeaning comments that lawyers direct at
the judge, court personnel, witnesses, and various others in adjudicative
proceedings. By exempting “legitimate advice or advocacy,”137 Rule
8.4(g) attempts to draw the line between advocates’ speech that might be
constitutionally protected because it advances the client’s lawful
interests by a procedurally permissible means, and advocates’
derogatory, demeaning, and biased speech that harms the administration
of justice rather than advancing it.138
Courts have broad authority to regulate speech in advocacy, and
especially in court, to promote the administration of justice.139 In the
context of advocacy, restrictions on gratuitously derogatory and
demeaning speech would probably serve compelling purposes like other
restrictions on speech that are taken for granted.140 For example, Rule
3.5(d), the professional conduct rule forbidding “conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal,” proscribes some abusive speech as well as physical
conduct.141 The rule’s restriction on speech is justified by the interest in
preserving the decorum of the tribunal.142 Restricting comments in court
gratuitously derogating or demeaning the judge would serve essentially
the same end. Likewise, Rule 4.4(a) forbids a lawyer from “us[ing]
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass” a party,
witness, or another third person during a representation.143 This
restriction reaches speech gratuitously embarrassing the third person but
can be justified because protecting participants from gratuitous
137. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1987) (citations omitted) (“Outside
the courtroom the lawyer may, as any other citizen, freely engage in the marketplace of ideas and
say all sorts of things, including things that are disagreeable and obnoxious . . . . But here
respondent was in the courtroom, an officer of the court engaged in court business, and for his
speech to be governed by appropriate rules of evidence, decorum, and professional conduct does not
offend the first amendment.”).
140. Thus, courts could adopt and enforce a rule forbidding derogatory and demeaning
statements that are prejudicial to the administration of justice. We do not mean to suggest, however,
that courts could adopt a rule forbidding derogatory and demeaning statements based on race, sex,
religion, etc., that are prejudicial to the administration of justice but excluding other derogatory and
demeaning statements that are prejudicial to the administration of justice. As previously noted, it is
doubtful that any compelling justification is closely served by the distinction, which constitutes
viewpoint discrimination. See id.
141. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
142. See id.
143. Id. r. 4.4(a).
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embarrassment encourages their willingness and ability to participate
effectively in the legal process.144 Barring gratuitously demeaning or
derogatory comments to other participants in the legal process may
promote a similar end. Parties and witnesses, who are often compelled to
participate in litigation, should not be distracted or discouraged by
derogatory, demeaning, or personally hurtful comments that are
unrelated to legitimate advocacy. Insofar as Rule 8.4(g) applies to this
sort of speech, one can regard it as a special application of Rule 8.4(d),
which forbids “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice,”145 and which has been applied to speech in litigation, 146
including speech that Rule 8.4(g) covers.147
It is doubtful, however, that justifications relating to the
administration of justice extend to another set of derogatory and
demeaning remarks covered by Rule 8.4(g)—namely, a lawyer’s uncivil,
biased comments to a lawyer’s opposing counsel or professional
colleague. Courts cannot regulate lawyers’ interactions with each other
as if lawyers are court employees. Much like private employers, courts
and other public employers have broad authority to regulate the speech
of employees while they are on the job.148 Public employers may adopt
workplace speech codes or otherwise regulate lawyers’ speech to
promote the work environment or to promote the public agency’s
mission.149 But lawyers (other than actual court employees) are
144. See id.
145. Id. r. 8.4(d) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice.”). The interest in protecting the administration of justice
would not justify sanctioning isolated incivility, however. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 647
(1985) (noting that “[t]he necessity for civility in the inherently contentious setting of the adversary
process suggests that members of the bar cast criticisms of the system in a professional and civil
tone. However, even assuming that the letter exhibited an unlawyerlike rudeness, a single incident
of rudeness or lack of professional courtesy—in this context—does not support” the imposition of
discipline).
146. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 2001) (applying Rule 8.4(d) to
a lawyer who disparaged the opposing party and counsel); In re McClellan, 754 N.E.2d 500, 501-02
(Ind. 2001) (applying Rule 8.4(d) to a lawyer whose rehearing petition demeaned the legal
profession); Miss. Bar v. Lumumba, 912 So. 2d 871, 881 (Miss. 2005) (applying Rule 8.4(d) to a
lawyer’s statements to a judge and to a newspaper reporter); Bd. of Pro. Resp. v. Slavin, 145
S.W.3d 538, 543, 550 (Tenn. 2004) (applying Rule 8.4(d) to disparaging statements in court filings).
147. See, e.g., In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397-98 (Minn. 1987) (disciplining lawyer for
antisemitic comment to opposing counsel in a deposition).
148. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
149. See id. at 426 (“We reject . . . the notion that the First Amendment shields from discipline
the expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties.”); Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (holding that the First Amendment does not protect the speech of “a public
employee [who] speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)
(stating that the State’s interests in regulating public employees’ speech “differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general”); see, e.g.,
Lumpkin v. Brown, 109 F.3d 1498, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the First Amendment did not
forbid the city’s Human Rights Commission member from terminating a minister’s service where
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independent of the courts,150 and the courts’ rulemaking authority is
subject to the same First Amendment limits as that of state legislatures
and other state regulatory entities when regulating private citizens.151
This makes it harder for courts to justify restrictions on lawyers’ biased
speech that does not tangibly threaten either the lawyer-client fiduciary
relationship or the administration of justice. Lawyers’ interchanges may
have no relationship to the administration of justice when they occur
outside the context of litigation; moreover, in many cases, litigators’
off-the-record discussions have no impact on the administration of
justice, even in the course of litigation.
C. Protecting Targets of Demeaning, Derogatory, and Hurtful Speech
In extreme cases, the restriction on lawyers’ biased speech will be
justified by the interest in protecting the targeted individual from harm
that is more significant than momentary upset or anger. Lawyers’
demeaning or derogatory speech may be so extreme or pervasive that it
interferes with the targeted individual’s ability to function in the legal
workplace. At that point, the First Amendment allows the speech to be
restricted because the government’s interest in protecting the target and
promoting a functioning legal environment is sufficiently compelling
and well-served by restricting the objectionable speech. Not to mention
that the line between speech and conduct is not so clear in this context.
As previously discussed, public institutions, such as public universities,
may adopt and enforce rules forbidding speech that is so extreme.152
Courts should have comparable power to restrict speech that creates
hostile work environments for lawyers and their employees. In
determining in a particular situation whether one’s speech causes
cognizable harm, not just annoyance or anger, a court can take account
of the content, including whether it is racist, sexist, or otherwise framed
in a way that is particularly likely to create a hostile environment for its
target.

his “statements explicitly condemning homosexuality as a sin and implicitly endorsing violence
against homosexuals are not simply hostile to the Commission’s charge, they are at war with it”).
150. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542-43 (2001) (“The advice
from the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as
governmental speech even under a generous understanding of the concept.”); Bruce A. Green,
Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 621-22
(2013) (maintaining that lawyers’ independence from the judiciary includes freedom to criticize
judges).
151. See Aviel, supra note 16, at 47-48 (comparing Rule 8.4(g) with state and federal
anti-discrimination laws that have been held compatible with the First Amendment).
152. See supra Part I.
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But Rule 8.4(g) is not directed exclusively, or primarily, at lawyers’
objectionable speech that impairs the target’s ability to function.153 In
fact, the speech need not even address a particular individual or
individuals, let alone harm them.154 If the lawyer’s speech is demeaning,
derogatory, or hurtful and it is based on a protected class (by which we
mean a class protected by the rule), the rule applies regardless of
whether the lawyer’s speech has any impact.155 The result is that the rule
reaches speech that is objectionable but that causes no harm to the
lawyer-client relationship or the administration of justice, and that
causes no cognizable harm to any individual. This will be true even
when a lawyer demeans or derogates another lawyer directly.
By way of example, consider the Wunsch case, with which we
began.156 A criminal defense lawyer, Swan, sent a letter that derogated
and demeaned the federal prosecutor, Artson, based on her gender.157
Given the history of gender discrimination and subordination in the legal
profession and in society generally,158 Swan’s letter may have pained
Artson, notwithstanding that in this instance she was the more powerful
lawyer both in the criminal case where they crossed swords (in which
she secured Swan’s disqualification) and in general (in that she wielded
the prosecution’s superior might).159 Nothing suggested that the letter
could impede Artson’s ability to conduct her work and, as the appellate
court explained, the letter had no tangible impact on the administration

153. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
154. Josh Blackman has made a compelling argument that the First Amendment will often
preclude Rule 8.4(g)’s application to lawyers’ speech in educational programs and similar settings
“related to the practice of law” but outside the actual delivery of legal services. Blackman, supra
note 14, at 255-57 (“As drafted, the rule could discipline a wide range of speech on matters of
public concern at events with only the most dubious connection with the practice of law. Though
these laws may survive a facial challenge, they are quite vulnerable to individual challenges.”). We
think that his argument is too modest, in that even in the practice of law, the justifications for
applying Rule 8.4(g) will often be insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny.
155. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
156. See supra Part I.
157. United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir. 1996).
158. The legal profession’s history of sexism, to the present day, has been documented
extensively. See, e.g., Katrina Lee, Discrimination as Anti-ethical: Achieving Systemic Change in
Large Law Firms, 98 DENV. L. REV. 581, 597-98 (2021) (describing systemic gender discrimination
and bias in law firms); Kimberly Jade Norwood, Gender Bias as the Norm in the Legal Profession:
It’s Still a [White] Man’s Game, WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y, 2020, at 25, 31-34 (describing gender bias
in law practice). For discussions of the utility of Rule 8.4(g) in addressing gender bias in the legal
profession, see Ashley Badesch, Lady Justice: The Ethical Considerations and Impacts of
Gender-Bias and Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession on Equal Access to Justice for Women,
31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 497, 507-09 (2018); Ashley Hart, Sexism “Related to the Practice of
Law”: The ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) Controversy, 51 IND. L. REV. 525, 537-38 (2018); Wendy N.
Hess, Addressing Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession: The Opportunity to Use Model Rule
8.4(g) to Protect Women From Harassment, 96 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 579, 590, 592, 596-98
(2019).
159. Wunsch, 84 F.3d at 1112-13.
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of justice.160 At worst, the letter might have angered or disturbed Artson.
This would be true even if Swan had sent the letter during ongoing
proceedings in the criminal case—for example, right after Artson filed
her disqualification motion.
Professional colleagues can have similar interactions where
objectionable speech violating Rule 8.4(g) has merely an emotional
sting. Suppose that a senior male prosecutor criticized Artson for
complaining to her supervisor or for initiating disciplinary proceedings,
telling her, “That was a ‘little girl’ move. Running to daddy makes you
look weak. Next time, just beat the pants off him again,” to which
Artson replied, “What do you know, you old coot! You have no idea
what it’s like to be a young woman in this profession. You’re ancient
and hopelessly out of touch!” Rule 8.4(g) would subject both lawyers to
discipline for denigrating each other—the senior prosecutor because he
targeted Artson’s gender, and Artson because she targeted her
colleague’s age.161
As this imagined exchange illustrates, the rule covers more than the
term “harassment” would ordinarily suggest.162 It covers far more than
harassment under civil rights law—for example, more than “unwelcome
sexual advances [and] requests for sexual favors”163—and more than
harassment under other professional conduct rules.164 It covers speech
that may be commonplace in law practice and elsewhere—namely, the
subclass of derogatory, demeaning, or emotionally hurtful speech that is
based on race, sex, religion, age, or another protected class. In this
example, the lawyers were expressing viewpoints—as disparaging and
demeaning speech often does—and the invocation of gender- and
age-related stereotypes was tied to the views the lawyers expressed.
They could have made their points without invoking objectionable,
emotionally hurtful stereotypes. But the First Amendment would not
allow the state to ban this type of expression generally, because the
restriction would not closely serve a compelling state interest.

160. Id. at 1116-17.
161. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). We assume that
these transgressions, like most, probably would not be reported to disciplinary authorities, and
would probably not elicit disciplinary authorities’ interest if they were. But this is not necessarily a
saving grace. See Park, supra note 15, at 279; Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 24-25
(E.D. Pa. 2020) (“Defendants effectively ask Plaintiff to trust them not to regulate and discipline his
offensive speech even though they have given themselves the authority to do so. So, despite asking
Plaintiff to trust them, there remains the constant threat that the rule will be engaged as the plain
language of it says it will be engaged.”).
162. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
163. Id.
164. See ABA Comm. On Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 7 (2020) (“Harassment is a
term of common meaning and usage under the Model Rules. It refers to conduct that is aggressively
invasive, pressuring, or intimidating.”).
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D. Promoting Public Confidence in the Legal Profession and the Legal
System
The comment to Rule 8.4(g) implies that even if others must be
allowed to speak more freely, professional conduct rules may restrict
lawyers’ biased speech related to the practice of law because such
speech “undermine[s] confidence in the legal profession and the legal
system.”165 More than two decades ago, a state court advanced a similar
rationale when it sanctioned a litigator under Rule 8.4(d) for moving to
foreclose a lawyer of color from serving as a criminal defendant’s
co-counsel.166 The court reasoned:
When any individual engages in race-based misconduct it undermines
the ideals of a society founded on the belief that all people are created
equal . . . . Left unchecked, such racially-biased actions as we have
here not only undermine confidence in our system of justice, but also
erode the very foundation upon which justice is based.167

The strict scrutiny test necessitates interrogating this claim insofar as it
is used to justify content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on speech.
One problem with the ABA’s theory is that in most cases, as in our
examples based on Wunsch, the speech violating Rule 8.4(g) occurs
privately—in a lawyer’s private correspondence or private
conversation.168 The rule can apply not only when a lawyer derogates or
demeans someone in a biased fashion to their face but also when the
target is not present and never knows of the biased, demeaning
remarks—and, indeed, even when the remarks do not refer to any
particular individual.169 Unless someone present publicizes the lawyer’s
remarks, the public is unlikely ever to know of them, much less be
affected by them.
But even if the lawyer’s biased speech is public, it is questionable
that punishing it, ostensibly to promote public confidence in lawyers or
the legal system, closely serves a compelling interest. As we argue
regarding whether courts can punish lawyers who tell political lies in the
public square, “the restriction must rest on more than mere conjecture;
there must be persuasive evidence that the speech in question
significantly erodes public trust.”170 We are unaware of any evidence
that, when the public learns of lawyers who make hurtful, biased

165. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
166. In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Contained in Panel File 98-26, 597 N.W.2d 563,
566-68 (Minn. 1999).
167. Id. at 567-68.
168. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
170. Green & Roiphe, supra note 135 (manuscript at 20, 50).
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statements relating to law practice, the public’s confidence in lawyers or
the legal system tends to erode.
This sort of justification for limits on lawyers’ speech is rarely
invoked successfully and when it is, it is used to justify interactions with
the public, like advertising,171 solicitation,172 and campaign donation
requests.173 The first two of these cases involve limits on commercial
speech, which, unlike Rule 8.4(g)’s speech restriction, are subject only
to intermediate scrutiny.174 Even under this less exacting standard, the
Court has been reluctant to uphold restrictions on speech based on this
justification and requires that the government proceed not on speculation
or intuition, but on a showing of actual harm to the profession that will
in fact be alleviated by the regulation.175 In Williams-Yulee v. Florida
Bar,176 the Court upheld a restriction on judicial campaign solicitations
on the theory that it furthered the government’s interest in preserving the
reputation of the judiciary.177 Justice Scalia argued in his dissent,
however, that this application of strict scrutiny was inconsistent with
case law:
The judges of this Court . . . evidently consider the preservation of
public respect for the courts a policy objective of the highest order. So
it is—but so too are preventing animal torture, protecting the
innocence of children, and honoring valiant soldiers. The Court did not
relax the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech when
legislatures pursued those goals.178

In other words, even though the government’s interest in the integrity of
the profession is a noble one, the speech restriction must nonetheless be
narrowly tailored to achieve it, an extremely difficult hurdle to clear.
Another problem in surviving strict scrutiny in this context is that
much of the speech covered by Rule 8.4(g), and particularly the speech
with which we are concerned, has nothing to do with “the legal system”
171. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 367-72 (1977) (rejecting the government’s
argument that restrictions on advertising would directly advance the government’s interest in
preserving the reputation of the profession).
172. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624-26 (1995) (relying on both the
reputation of the legal profession and the government’s interest in preserving the privacy of accident
victims to justify the limits on mailed solicitations).
173. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 455 (2015) (upholding a limitation on
judicial solicitation of campaign contributions under intermediate scrutiny because the rule directly
advanced the interest in the reputation of the judiciary).
174. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (requiring that the restriction advance the government’s interest in a
direct and material way); supra Part II.C.
175. Went for It Inc., 515 U.S. at 625-26 (relying on a 106-page study showing that the public
views direct mail solicitation as a poor reflection of the Bar).
176. 575 U.S. at 433.
177. Id. at 445.
178. Id. at 473 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and little to do with “the legal profession.”179 Will a lawyer’s biased
comment or tasteless joke at a law firm event unrelated to law practice
really erode the public reputation of the legal profession?
As discussed above, we are principally concerned with how Rule
8.4(g) applies in contexts where the speech at issue cannot fairly be said
to be “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”180 Concern for the
public perception of the legal system cannot justify restrictions on
speech that have no implication for whether the legal system functions
fairly or whether it achieves fair outcomes. This rationale is irrelevant to
speech in professional, educational, and social events—speech that
seems to be covered by Rule 8.4(g) since it is “related to the practice of
law.”181 It is also irrelevant to speech in transactional representations and
other representations unrelated to the legal system. And even in
advocacy, the interest in promoting public confidence in the legal system
is not closely served by a restriction on off-the-record speech between
lawyers—whether between opposing counsel or between co-counsel.
When lawyers’ biased speech has no impact on the course of justice, the
speech is unlikely to erode public confidence in the legal system.
Lawyers’ biased speech also may have little or no implication for
how the public perceives “the legal profession,” beyond perhaps
confirming that in a profession of over a million lawyers, some lawyers
are both uncivil and biased. There is no compelling reason to restrict
lawyers’ speech to fool the public into believing this is not so: the public
is entitled to know the truth. Besides that, the rule does little to keep the
truth from slipping out. It leaves lawyers free in law practice to make
demeaning, disparaging, and hurtful comments that are unbiased or to
make biased statements that are not disparaging, demeaning, or hurtful.
Further, lawyers may engage in uncivil, biased speech unrelated to law
practice or harassing or discriminatory speech that promotes diversity
and inclusion in the profession. Therefore, the rule does little to prevent
uncivil, biased lawyers from revealing their true selves.
E. Identifying Lawyers with Bad Character or Bad Views
If speech covered by the rule undermines public confidence in the
legal profession or the legal system, the reason cannot be because the
speech itself causes some sort of harm beyond hurt feelings, because in
many situations it will not. And the reason cannot be simply that the
lawyers are revealed to hold the biased views that they expressed, since
179. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); Blackman, supra
note 14, at 256-57.
180. See supra Part III.B.
181. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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the lawyers are allowed to express those views so long as they are not
engaged in law-related practice.
One might posit that the rule’s premise is that lawyers who express
inappropriate bias related to law practice presumptively have a biased
character that will spill out into other aspects of their legal work, just as
other rules presuppose that a lawyer’s dishonest act may reflect a general
lack of integrity or a lawyer’s criminal act may reflect general
lawlessness.182 But if this were a rule designed to weed out lawyers with
a bad character for law practice, the rule would apply to all expressions
of objectionable bias, not only to those that are linked to discrimination
or harassment (as broadly defined in the comment);183 it would sweep in
biased statements regardless of whether they related to law practice.
Given the rule’s limitations, it is hard to defend it as a rule targeting bad
character.
Beyond that, the profession has never adopted the view that an
unbiased character is a prerequisite for law practice. Although, in an
extreme case, the Illinois admissions authorities denied admission to
Matthew Hale, an avowed white supremacist, largely because of his
overtly racist views,184 his conduct provided further grounds for the
decision,185 and some questioned whether avowed racism would have
sufficed.186 With the possible exception of Hale, we know of no
examples of racists, sexists, religious bigots, homophobes, etc., being
excluded from the profession because of their biased views. The courts,
through the admissions and disciplinary processes, may exclude people
who are dishonest or lawless,187 but we doubt they may exclude those
182. See id. r. 8.4(c)–(d).
183. Id. r. 8.4 cmt. 3.
184. For discussions of the various decisions regarding Hale’s application to the Illinois Bar,
see Jason O. Billy, Confronting Racists at the Bar: Matthew Hale, Moral Character, and
Regulating the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 25, 29-32 (2006); Richard L.
Sloane, Note, Barbarian at the Gates: Revisiting the Case of Matthew F. Hale to Reaffirm That
Character and Fitness Evaluations Appropriately Preclude Racists From the Practice of Law, 15
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 397, 416-29 (2002).
185. See Sloane, supra note 184, at 431 (maintaining that denying Hale admission to the Bar
was warranted by “the totality of the circumstances—Hale’s beliefs, his record of violence, various
lies, and concealment of material information”).
186. See Billy, supra note 184, at 41 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow state bar
authorities to speed up the death of racism through the kind of politicization of the bar admission
process exhibited by Illinois’s Committee on Character and Fitness in Hale’s case.”); Steven Lubet,
Can a Racist Be a Lawyer?, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 3, 1999, 12:00 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1999-08-03-9908030019-story.html (“Racist ideas
are ideas nonetheless, and once we begin penalizing people for their opinions it is impossible to
predict where the process will stop.”). But see Carla D. Pratt, Should Klansmen Be Lawyers?:
Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 857, 909 (2003) (“So
if color-blindness is the goal for our legal system and not just a catchy phrase to be used to promote
the interests of whites, then persons who seek to use color as the basis to deny our citizens of color
full participation in and protection under our legal system should be excluded from the bar.”).
187. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 262-64 (1957).
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who are biased. While the legal profession and law practice have been
prone to racism,188 sexism,189 religious bigotry,190 anti-gay bias,191
ageism,192 and other biases, and courts are right to take countermeasures,
they cannot punish lawyers who reject their views of equality. For
example, Swan could not be excluded from law practice for believing
that “[female lawyers are outside the law, cloud truth and destroy
order,]” for publicly espousing this belief (however absurd), or for
possessing a biased character given this avowed belief.193
Even if courts were to attempt to rid the profession of those who
would bring disfavored biases to their work, it is doubtful that a lawyer’s
violation of Rule 8.4(g) demonstrates that one possesses a biased
character that will be expressed in one’s law practice more generally.
The traditional idea that lawyers have a discernible character—for
example, for honesty or lawfulness—that predicts how they will conduct
their legal practices rests on shaky grounds from a social science
perspective.194 The idea that non-bias, in particular, is such a defining,
immutable trait of character, not just a set of beliefs, is novel. And if
there is such a thing as a biased character that predicts how one practices

188. See, e.g., John G. Browning, Righting Past Wrongs: Posthumous Bar Admissions and the
Quest for Racial Justice, BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y, 2021, at 1 passim (describing
posthumous admission of Bar applicants who were denied admission on racial grounds); Raymond
H. Brescia, Lessons From the Present: Three Crises and Their Potential Impact on the Legal
Profession, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 607, 651-62 (2021) (describing the legal profession’s response to
its current lack of diversity); Veronica Root Martinez, Combating Silence in the Profession, 105
VA. L. REV. 805, 817 (2019) (“[T]he history of overt, systematic discrimination, racism, and
misogyny throughout the American legal profession remains undisputed, and its impact continues to
resound in the lives of lawyers today.”); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So
Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 509-10 (1996) (identifying
racism as among the barriers limiting the number of Black lawyers in corporate law firms).
189. See supra note 158.
190. See, e.g., Sarah Malik & Mustafa T. Kasubhai, Is There a Place for Us? On Being a
Muslim-American in Oregon’s Legal Community, OR. ST. BAR BULL., Feb.–Mar. 2021, at 18, 24
(“[I]t’s important to acknowledge that for most of my adult life—including in law school, private
practice and as a judge—I have had a recurrent experience whenever a tragic act of terrorist
violence occurs anywhere in the world . . . . I brace for the backlash of hate crimes directed at
anyone who might look like a Muslim, including family members, friends and me.”).
191. See, e.g., Los Angeles County Bar Association’s Ad Hoc Committee on Sexual
Orientation Bias, The Los Angeles County Bar Association Report on Sexual Orientation Bias, 4 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 305, 310-36 (1995) (documenting sexual orientation
discrimination in the legal profession).
192. See, e.g., Ashleigh Parker Dunston, A Call to Action: Fighting Racial Inequality Behind
the Bench, 43 CAMPBELL L. REV. 109, 109 (2021) (“I’m a thirty-three-year-old, black woman and
have been practicing law for only the last eight years and serving on the bench for the past three
years; however, even during that small amount of time, I have experienced my fair share of racism,
sexism, and ageism. I’ve been asked if I’m the secretary, ignored during calendar calls, told that I
was ‘unqualified, inexperienced, and too young’ to be a judge, and had a defendant ask for a ‘white
male judge next time’—just to name a few of my experiences.”).
193. See United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1113, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 1996).
194. See Green & Roiphe, supra note 135 (manuscript at 39).
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law, there is no reason to think that a single violation of Rule 8.4(g)
reveals it.
In sum, when it comes to a significant amount of speech covered by
Rule 8.4(g) as the ABA interprets it, we doubt that Rule 8.4(g) closely
serves a compelling interest in promoting public confidence in the legal
profession or the legal system. If Rule 8.4(g) advances these interests by
targeting certain biased speech that derogates, demeans, or causes
emotional harm, it is not because the particular speech itself undermines
public confidence in the legal profession or the legal system. It is
because the professional conduct rule itself makes a statement.
Specifically, the rule expresses the commitment of the organized
Bar and, where the rule is adopted, of state courts to the values or
principles animating the rule—namely, that people are entitled to equal
dignity regardless of their race, sex, religion, etc., and should not be
subject to gratuitously hurtful comments targeted at these attributes.195
We do not doubt that courts can and should express this commitment
and that the organized Bar should encourage courts to do so. But courts
must express this commitment other than by restricting speech that
expresses an opposing viewpoint.196 The state (including through judicial
rulemaking) cannot permissibly punish lawyers’ speech to affirm the
judiciary’s commitment to a different viewpoint, however convinced we
are that the judiciary’s view of equality is essential to the fair and just
operation of the courts.
While some speech covered by the rule can be restricted, not all can
be. As construed by the accompanying comment and by the ABA Ethics
Opinion, the rule covers much speech that is constitutionally protected

195. Cf. Gillers, supra note 17, at 222-24. In this respect, the rule might be characterized as
“largely symbolic.” See Meredith R. Miller, Going Beyond Rule 8.4(G): A Shift to Active and
Conscious Efforts to Dismantle Bias, 10 J. RACE, GENDER, & ETHNICITY 23, 33 (2021). Of course,
the symbolic meaning addresses only derogatory speech that demeans certain groups. If the speech
promotes diversity and inclusion, it is acceptable to the Bar. MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
8.4(g), cmt 4 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020).
196. See, e.g., Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984) (“[T]here are some purported interests—such as a desire to suppress support for . . . . an
unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of
ideas—that are so plainly illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule.”). While
equality is a noble goal—one that is embodied in the 14th Amendment of the Constitution—it is, in
this context, in tension with the Constitution’s commitment to self-determination, which is, in turn,
embodied in the First Amendment’s right to free speech. It is not clear why the Bar’s reputation
depends on the former but not the latter or why the Bar should resolve that tension in any way
differently from how the law resolves it for the general public. For a discussion of the tension
between equality and self-determination and its implications for hate speech, see Robert C. Post,
Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 290-93
(1991).
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because no compelling interest is closely served by forbidding it. 197 The
Wunsch case, and our further scenarios based on it, illustrate this.
IV.

WHY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES SHOULD NOT PUSH
THE EDGES OF FIRST AMENDMENT LAW

Even if Model Rule 8.4(g) can withstand a facial challenge, state
courts should not adopt it because they should not flirt with the First
Amendment’s limits. To be sure, purging the profession of biased,
hateful speech is a noble cause. But like other such worthy causes, it
should, as a general matter, be pursued by means other than banning
speech. Rule 8.4(g) will chill valuable speech, and its broad language
leaves a dangerous amount of discretion to regulators to pick and choose
which violations to pursue.
Many of the cases dealing with university and college harassment
policies emphasize that college is a place where open dialogue is
fundamental, and the same might be said of law offices and bar
associations. As one court explained, “Intellectual advancement has
traditionally progressed through discord and dissent, as a diversity of
views ensures that ideas survive because they are correct, not because
they are popular.”198 Certainly, when a lawyer is acting in court or in his
role as a fiduciary, this would not be an accurate description of the
profession.199 Limits on speech are necessary to ensure the proper
administration of justice. But lawyers play a number of roles in society.
They are also professors, government officials, pundits, advocates of law
reform, and public intellectuals. Sometimes those roles overlap with
legal work as lawyers represent important, and at times contrarian, views
in court.200 In these roles, lawyers too are tasked with engaging in public
debate. One might even argue that given their education and training,
lawyers are particularly well-suited to this job. The Bar should
encourage rather than chill them in this endeavor.
A diverse bar is also desirable because even in their representative
capacity, lawyers give voice to a wide array of different clients, some
with unpopular views. As a general matter, this is important to ensure
197. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 7 (2020).
198. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2010).
199. See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 43-45 (2012)
(ebook) (arguing that professions and other experts need to limit speech in certain contexts to
promote the development of expert knowledge).
200. See id. at 43 (arguing that professionals and experts play many roles and that their speech
must be protected insofar as they are contributing to a discourse in the public square). The Supreme
Court has made clear that some speech in court is protected speech for this reason. See Legal Servs.
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 538-39, 544, 549 (2001) (striking down funding restrictions that
limited the arguments that Legal Aid lawyers could make on behalf of clients).
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that the diverse perspectives in society can find representation.201 In the
past, the Bar has used rules that limit speech to deter or divest itself of
lawyers with unpopular views. It has done so in part to exclude or deter
those who would be most likely to represent unpopular clients. In the
McCarthy Era, for instance, the Bar used its character and fitness review
process,202 rules against offensive speech in the courtroom,203 and rules
about prejudicing ongoing proceedings204 to chill lawyers who
represented controversial clients and positions.205 The Bar embraced its
fight against communism with the same fervor it currently invokes to
battle discriminatory speech and conduct.206 This was a dark moment in
the Bar’s past. It is not that we value lawyers who spew hateful speech,
quite the contrary, but if the Bar takes an expansive view of its power to
police lawyers’ speech, it will inevitably use this to stifle the voices of
unpopular but worthy lawyers and clients in the future. It may well chill
those with reasonable views as it seeks out the truly hateful lawyers.
This is especially so as some critics define racism so broadly to include
any support for policies that impact races differently.207
In drafting Rule 8.4(g), the ABA seemed to acknowledge this
concern by carving out an exception when the lawyer is engaged in
“legitimate advice or advocacy.”208 But if there are some messages that
would be appropriate to utter on behalf of a client, say, “homosexuality
201. Of course, representing a client does not necessarily mean that a lawyer shares or
approves of that client’s views, beliefs, or objectives. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(b)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). But lawyers can also choose their clients, and many choose not to represent
clients with whom they disagree, especially high-profile clients. See Monroe H. Freedman, The
Lawyer’s Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 111, 111-12 (1995) (arguing that
lawyers can choose their clients and therefore owe an obligation to explain why they choose to
represent controversial clients). In a dissent in a libel case, Chief Justice Warren Burger explained
that this fundamental role of lawyers in representing unpopular causes ought to inform First
Amendment analysis when lawyers are involved. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 355
(1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
202. See, e.g., Law Students Civ. Rts. Rsch. Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 159
(1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 29 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 7 (1971); In re
Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82, 83 n.1, 88 (1961); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232,
239 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1957).
203. See In re Disbarment of Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 289 (1953). This decision was set aside.
In re Disbarment of Isserman, 348 U.S. 1, 1 (1954) (per curiam).
204. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 623-26 (1959) (reviewing a case in which the lawyer had
been sanctioned for a speech she made six weeks after a trial had begun criticizing the government
prosecution in a Smith Act case).
205. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 231-263 (1976) (ebook).
206. See Arthur G. Powell, The Point Where Toleration Ends, 34 A.B.A. J. 696, 696 (1948)
(insisting on a crusading effort to purge the ranks of the Bar of communism).
207. IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 13-24 (2019). This is not merely
speculative. A judge speaking at a university event noted that certain racial groups commit crimes at
a rate disproportionate to their population. A disciplinary complaint was filed against her that
resulted in a nearly two-year investigation. Greenberg v. Goodrich, No. 20-03822, 2022 WL
874953, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2022).
208. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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is a sin and, therefore, my religious client should not have to bake a cake
for a gay marriage,” why should those same messages be banned if
spoken by the lawyer on her own behalf at a law-related function? Why
are a smaller subset of views acceptable within the legal profession than
without?
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Bar also
exploited what it considered its special ability to repress speech to
enforce rules against solicitation and advertising.209 These rules, too,
were used to exclude newcomers to the profession, immigrant lawyers,
and others who represented plaintiffs and had to use advertising to
obtain clients.210 The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated many of
these restrictions on lawyer advertising on First Amendment grounds. 211
But, as historian Jerold Auerbach has argued, this was only after the Bar
had managed to shape the course of substantive law by excluding
lawyers who would represent the needs of the poor.212
African American lawyers, too, have been the target of the Bar’s
aggressive enforcement of speech-related offenses. The Oklahoma Bar
Association, for instance, sought sanctions against a lawyer for calling a
trial judge a racist, and a lawyer in Arkansas was disbarred for, among
other things, accusing a white lawyer of racism.213 Cases like this do not
prove a pattern but they do show that rules targeting speech are used
differently by different authorities. The best way to protect less powerful
lawyers is to avoid aggressive use of speech restrictions, not to broaden
discretion in the area. Rule 8.4(g) does the latter.
The legal profession is also one that thrives on the clash of ideas,
the confrontation with contrary arguments, and robust debate. Of course,
this should be carried on in a civil manner, and biased and derogatory
words are not only unnecessary but unwelcome in professional
discourse. But there are ways of promoting civility in the profession
other than pushing the limits of the First Amendment, which will
invariably chill useful debate. Enforcing norms of the profession by
imposing reputational consequences does a great deal to develop a code
of conduct. If lawyers cannot model the willingness to fight unpopular,
even hateful views, by arguing against them rather than punishing them,
209. See AUERBACH, supra note 205, at 42-44.
210. See id. at 43.
211. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
212. See AUERBACH, supra note 205, at 42.
213. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 960-61 (Okla. 1988). The Porter
court refused to impose sanctions, but the case nonetheless shows that different bars can use their
discretion to pursue lawyers for their speech to target minorities. W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech
for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 305, 391 (2001) (citing Porter, 766 P.2d at 969). In Ligon,
the court disbarred a black lawyer for, among other things, insulting a white lawyer and calling him
a racist. Ligon v. McCullough, 247 S.W.3d 868, 869 (Ark. 2007) (per curiam); Ligon v.
McCullough, 303 S.W.3d 78, 85 (Ark. 2009).
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then who can? Restraints on lawyers’ speech should be reserved for
speech that is not constitutionally protected—for example, biased or
discriminatory speech that betrays the lawyer’s fiduciary obligations,
interferes with the administration of justice, or harms others in a
concrete way beyond angering or saddening them.
Like workplace harassment laws,214 Rule 8.4(g) will chill protected
speech. Workplace harassment laws chill speech, in part, by inducing
employers who are concerned about civil liability to steer their
employees away from the line.215 Most legal employers are covered by
workplace harassment laws, and Rule 8.4(g), by expanding on the scope
of anti-harassment law, will cause legal employers to regulate lawyers’
speech even more aggressively. Even with the caveats in the ABA
opinion,216 and scholars’ reassurances that regulators will not pursue
pure political speech,217 lawyers may hesitate to share opinions or make
arguments that could conceivably be viewed as harassment or
discrimination under the broadly worded rule. A lawyer’s speech at a
CLE program arguing that same-sex marriage should not have been
afforded constitutional protection or another lawyer’s argument about
the value of policing low-level crime might never occur for fear of
sanction. These opinions may be unpopular, but they should be heard.
Justice Brandeis famously wrote, “If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence.”218 This concept is not alien to the legal profession, but
rather the nature of our trade. Law school teaches us to combat words
with more words. The organized Bar and courts should not test the limits
of the First Amendment but should encourage lawyers to use their skills
and training to try to guide the public discussion in the right direction.
Consider one last scenario, again building on the Wunsch case.219
Suppose that the lawyer, Swan, tells a group of junior male lawyers at
his law firm or in a social gathering, “Never trust a female prosecutor.”
The ABA Ethics Opinion interpreting Rule 8.4(g) tells us that this sort of
remark violates the rule.220 But we question the rule’s premise that this
belief, however deplorable, is best suppressed on pain of professional
discipline. One can anticipate, among a group of junior lawyers who are
214. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
215. Volokh, supra note 105, at 1811-14.
216. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 9 (2020).
217. See Gillers, supra note 17, at 235.
218. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, J. J., concurring).
Former head of the ACLU, Nadine Strossen defends this principle when it comes to hate speech.
NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP
14-15 (Geoffrey R. Stone, ed., 2018) (ebook).
219. United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1996).
220. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 493, at 5-6, 8 (2020).
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trained to question and to demand evidence for dubious assertions, Swan
would be pressed to defend his view. In response, Swan might express a
general animus toward women or a stereotypical belief that women are
untrustworthy because they do not play fair; or he might generalize
specifically about female lawyers or female prosecutors based on his
particular experience with Elana Artson. It is hard to imagine that
Swan’s audience would accept his explanation, and regardless of his
status, it seems likely they would challenge it, perhaps even persuading
him to acknowledge that his view is unfounded.
This is not to say that more speech is always a perfect, or even a
very effective, way of countering unpleasant, offensive, or wrong
speech, but rather that it is better than the alternative. Nadine Strossen,
former head of the ACLU, has argued that laws aimed at hate speech
generally do more harm than good.221 No matter how well-intentioned,
these laws are invariably used to suppress the views of those who oppose
government policies or support minority beliefs or ideas.222 They
entrench the power of dominant groups and further disempower
minorities and other marginalized people. Not only that, but as Strossen
demonstrates, censorship is not even an effective way to address
intolerance.223 Historically, laws aimed at curtailing hate speech are not
correlated with the reduction of hate. The laws tend to drive such speech
underground or force its users to disguise their bigotry in a way that
makes it more socially acceptable but no less insidious. In addition,
banning speech can actually draw people’s attention to the speech,
amplifying its message rather than stifling it.224
Some have argued, to the contrary, that regulating racist speech will
ultimately promote the ends of the First Amendment, particularly the
integrity of public discourse. Put another way, the goal of equality
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment demands subordination of free
speech rights. As Robert C. Post points out, those opposed to flag
burning made a similar argument: free speech ought to be compromised
just a little bit by banishing this one clearly distasteful message, for
important reasons.225 This balancing of the very minor nature of the
speech infringement with the importance of a particular societal goal is
neither sanctioned by current case law nor wise.226 As Post explains,
221. STROSSEN, supra note 218, at 14-15.
222. Id. This is often called the “Streisand Effect,” named after an incident in which Barbara
Streisand tried to erase images of her home from social media, leading to an even wider
dissemination of the images. Id. at 146.
223. Id. at 157, 160-62, 164.
224. Id. at 136.
225. Post, supra note 196, at 314-15.
226. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of
free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative
social costs and benefits.”).
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“[T]here is no shortage of powerful groups contending that uncivil
speech within public discourse ought to be ‘minimally’ regulated for
highly pressing symbolic reasons.”227 While most will agree that equal
treatment for those who have experienced historic discrimination is a
noble goal, it is not, in a principled way, different from patriotism,
protecting and honoring the military, or preventing the spread of
communism, which have all been invoked in the past to suppress
offensive speech.228 There are ways for us to pursue equality in the
public square, as well as in the profession, that do not involve stifling
speech. And if suppressing speech is necessary, the strict scrutiny test
strikes the right balance. The government can compromise free speech
for the sake of equality only when doing so is absolutely necessary to
achieve equality or any other noble goal.
Perhaps, the legal profession is different. Perhaps, it ought to be
more committed to equality than the outside world. But this does not
change the calculus, because the profession must also have an equally
enhanced obligation to uphold and embody First Amendment values,
like a robust public discourse. If the profession is committed to the
Constitution and the rule of law, it is not clear why the potential clash
between these two values ought to be resolved differently within the
profession than without.
Courts have a history of employing professional conduct rules to
restrict lawyers’ speech, testing, and sometimes overstepping the
constitutional limits. For example, some courts have aggressively
policed lawyers’ false criticisms of judges.229 Rule 8.2(a), which bars
falsehoods about judges’ integrity or qualifications, has mostly been
applied to lawyers who lie in court or in pleadings during a proceeding,
but the rule also allows courts to punish lawyers for false statements
unrelated to an ongoing or pending court case.230 First Amendment
scholars have criticized the rule, contending that lawyers play a vital role
not only as officers of the court, but also as a check on judicial power,
and that in that latter role they need latitude to criticize courts.231 We
227. Post, supra note 196, at 316.
228. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (reversing a conviction for
disorderly conduct based on the defendant’s wearing a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft”);
Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 420 (1989) (affirming reversal of a conviction for destroying a
venerated object based on the defendant’s burning a flag at a rally to protest former President
Reagan’s policies); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (striking down a
requirement that recipients of Communist literature notify the Post Office that they wish to receive
it).
229. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); Green & Roiphe,
supra note 135 (manuscript at 30).
230. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
231. Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in Court
Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 373 (2010) (arguing that a right to impugn the judiciary even
during proceedings is necessary to ensure litigants’ rights to a fair judiciary); Erwin Chemerinsky,
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agree with this criticism, but even if the rule were sound, it differs from
the anti-harassment rule which is in no way limited to speech that affects
the administration of justice or the decorum of the courtroom.
Under the guise of civility or preserving the reputation of the
profession, the Bar has used rules to exclude or persecute the most
marginalized within the profession.232 Adopting Rule 8.4(g), which tests
or pushes the First Amendment limits, will create a precedent going
forward that may later be used in a nefarious way. Better to learn from
history and back away from that line.
V.

CONCLUSION

Model Rule 8.4(g) would be unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination and content regulation if it were aimed at the public more
broadly.233 As fiduciaries to courts and clients, lawyers may be subject to
greater speech restrictions than others if their words clearly interfere
with these roles, or if the restrictions otherwise serve a compelling state
interest, but there is no categorical exception to the First Amendment for
professional speech.
As our analysis reveals, Rule 8.4(g) covers a significant amount of
protected speech because, in many instances in which it applies, it is not
narrowly tailored to serve any compelling government interest.234 We do
not focus on whether the rule is unconstitutional on its face, however.
We argue that state courts should not adopt rules like this one when they
come close to the line drawn by the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech.235 History shows that restrictions on lawyers’ speech
are employed to chill valuable expression and that regulators use the
discretion afforded by such restrictions against the most unpopular and
marginalized lawyers and causes.
Others have focused on the rule’s most obvious constitutional
deficiency: that it allows courts to punish lawyers for advancing
controversial and offensive views in a legal educational forum. We have
sought to show that the rule also covers a wide range of protected speech
in the legal workplace and in legal representations.236 We give the
Silence is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859,
884-86 (1998) (arguing that the actual malice test ought to apply to lawyers in disciplinary
proceedings for impugning the reputation of a judge).
232. See AUERBACH, supra note 205, at 3-14 (arguing that the Bar is motivated by an elite
desire to secure its own status and serve capitalist interests); James E. Moliterno, Politically
Motivated Bar Discipline, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 725, 730-52 (2005) (chronicling the Bar’s history of
using discipline to punish and exclude lawyers who represent controversial causes).
233. See supra Part II.A–B.
234. See supra Part III.A–E.
235. See supra Part IV.
236. See supra Part III.A–E.
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example of the criminal defense lawyer in the Wunsch case who sent an
offensive, sexist letter to a prosecutor.237 The words did not affect the
prosecutor’s work, nor did they interfere with the judicial process, but
Rule 8.4(g) would clearly apply, nonetheless. While we join the vast
majority of lawyers who would condemn this missive, we emphasize
that the lawyer expressed a viewpoint, an idea entitled to First
Amendment protection. If this lawyer were punished, others might well
refrain from criticizing prosecutors in the future, out of a fear that they
could say something biased or derogatory. With so many potential
violations of the rule, regulators will have to pick and choose. Trusting
them to pursue only the truly bad actors would be unwise. History
shows, to the contrary, that this sort of discretion is consistently
exercised against lawyers who represent unpopular causes, marginalized
lawyers, and others who are seeking controversial law reform.
Instead of opting for repression, lawyers trained in argument and
persuasion should work to inspire the profession to become a more civil
and inclusive group. There is no evidence that restrictions on speech like
Model Rule 8.4(g) achieve their ambitions. The rule may deter racist and
sexist lawyers from openly speaking their minds, but these lawyers’
hateful views may well take a more insidious form. While it is
appropriate for disciplinary rules to address harmful conduct, the better
response to most hateful speech is more speech.

237. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.

